In a version of the Ellsberg Paradox, the decision-maker is confronted with two urns, each containing 100 balls that are either Red or Blue. She is told that there are 50 of each color in the …rst ('unambiguous') urn, but no further information is provided about the second ('ambiguous') urn. There is a widely exhibited preference to bet on drawing Red (or Blue) from the …rst urn rather than from the second. Though such rankings are intuitive, they are inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory and, more generally, with reliance on any single probability measure to represent beliefs. Thus the Paradox illustrates the behavioral meaning of the Knightian distinction between risk (measurable or probabilistic uncertainty) and ambiguity (unmeasurable uncertainty).
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The importance of the Ellsberg Paradox is the intuition that this distinction may be important much more widely. In particular, it seems at least plausible to view consumptionsavings and portfolio choice decisions as being qualitatively di¤erent than the choice of which bet to accept on the outcome of a coin ‡ip; only the latter is a choice between risky prospects.
My objective in this paper is to illustrate both the tractability and potential fruitfulness (for addressing the home-bias puzzle, for example) of a macro-style model that permits aversion not only to risk but also to ambiguity.
I employ a simple two-period heterogeneous-agent economy. The time periods are t 1 ('today') and t ('tomorrow'). Uncertainty is represented by the state space . There are two consumers and consumer i's consumption process is c faces an analogue of the 2-urn Ellsberg setting, though the identity of the ambiguous urn di¤ers between countries consistent with the subjective nature of ambiguity. Note that each set of priors contains P .
The description of the economy is completed by specifying utilities and the endowment.
Country i's utility function is
where 0 < < 1. The standard logarithmic model is obtained in the special case
The aggregate endowment is Y t 1 and Y t , where
Thus e 
II. EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
E¢ cient allocations solve the planning problem
where > 0 is the relative utility weight for country 2. At any allocation and resulting consumption for 1, there is a measure Q 1 that solves the minimization in (1). Then Q 1 is completely described by the probability, denoted
, that it assigns to the event W 2 t = 1. Similarly for country 2. Thus an envelope theorem implies the same …rst-order conditions as would apply for a planning problem in which sets of priors are replaced by the single prior
Deduce that
These expressions do not fully describe e¢ cient allocations because the i 's and hence t are endogenous. Since i corresponds to a subjectively worst measure in P i , one might expect that it equal an extreme point i . In fact, that is not necessarily true as indicated in the complete description of e¢ cient allocations that follows.
where t is de…ned in (3). Then an allocation solves (2) if and only if it has the form (4) where is the unique solution to
The latter solution satis…es 0.
The formalism surrounding (5) suggests an interpretation whereby ( ) represents the demand for volatility, s Y is the supply and these are equilibrated by adjustment of , the relevant (constrained) 'price'. Consistent with this interpretation, we have a complementary slackness condition, whereby for each i,
In the special case ( ) < s Y , then = , which means that each country acts as though she attaches the smallest possible probability to good realizations of the foreign 
that is, countries do not act as though an extreme point in their set of priors applies. Here beliefs, in the sense of the shadow singleton prior for each agent, are selected endogenously in equilibrium.
Uniqueness of the solution implies uniqueness of the Arrow-Debreu prices that support the e¢ cient allocation corresponding to any given . This is in contrast to my paper with Tan Wang (1994) that emphasizes the potential of ambiguity for generating price indeterminacy. Consumption in each country is non-negatively correlated with shocks in both countries. For the domestic shock, this is evident from (4); for the foreign shock, (5) implies
The extreme of equality with zero occurs precisely in allocations corresponding to (6); for example, if the ambiguity parameter is large. Thus even when i's ambiguity about W j t is large, it is not e¢ cient for her to 'short'the foreign shock.
A second implication is that consumption growth rates are not perfectly correlated across countries. In fact, idiosyncratic consumption growth rates are positively correlated with idiosyncratic shocks in the sense that (if j > 0)
Comparative statics analysis of (5) ) and a redistribution towards country 2 (increase in ) makes 2 more optimistic and 1 more pessimistic. Finally, if one measures the size of home-bias in each country by the covariance in (7), then redistribution towards country 2 reduces home-bias there and increases it in country 1.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM
I include a sketch of the nontrivial part of the proof in order to emphasize its simplicity and because it is informative also about the nature of arguments needed in a multi-period setting.
To show that every e¢ cient allocation has the stated form, focus on the period t component of the planning problem (2), namely on
where consumption levels are constrained by c i t Y t , I have applied the minimax theorem to reverse the min and max operations, j 6 = i in the last summation and where
The envelope theorem implies that (using the fact that each u i ( ) = log( ))
Thus the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem implies (5).
The optimal must satisfy 0 because 2 ), but the latter is negative. This completes the proof.
The comparative statics analysis made use of the following: As a pointwise maximum of a collection of linear (in ) functions, J( ; ) is convex for each . Therefore, (8) implies that
and both matrices are negative de…nite. In particular, det (D ( )) < 0 and @ i =@ j < 0 for i 6 = j.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The preceding model can be extended to a multi-period setting. Think of a two-dimensional state process W t = (W 1 t ; W 2 t ) that is a random walk under a reference probability measure. Suppose that while country i is con…dent that the domestic shock is a random walk, she views W j t as an ambiguous random walk, that is, conditional on the state at time t 1, her beliefs are that W 
for a suitable set P i of priors over possible trajectories of W t . 4 This utility speci…cation has a number of attractive features that I now describe.
First, it has a suitable continuous-time limit, as described in work with Werner Ploberger (2001), where the driving state process is an ambiguous Brownian motion. Jianjun Miao and I (2000) have applied the resulting model of utility to a two-country setting that is the continuous-time counterpart of this paper's model. The analytical power of continuoustime permits sharp results to be derived; they con…rm and extend those reported above. In particular, we describe the implementation of e¢ cient allocations as a Radner equilibrium and describe asset market implications (home-bias in equities, for example) of ambiguity.
My paper with Martin Schneider (2001b) provides a simple axiomatic basis for a generalization of (9) in which P i is restricted to conform to the 'spirit'but not the letter of the above story about an ambiguous random walk. The essential characterizing axioms are: (i) each conditional utility V i t satis…es the axioms described by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) that characterize the multiple-priors model in an atemporal or one-shot choice framework; and (ii) the collection fV t g t 0 of all conditional preferences is dynamically consistent. In contrast, the related model of utility proposed by Evan Anderson et al. (2000) , which is also the subject of another paper in this session, violates dynamic consistency. In particular, plans that are optimal from the perspective of time 0 will generally not be carried out.
5
Further, learning can be accommodated. Though the speci…c conditional one-step-ahead beliefs described above are the same at every node and thus do not respond to past observations, the model in its general axiomatic form permits such responsiveness to data (see my papers with Zengjing Chen (2000) and with Schneider (2001a)). Prior by prior application of Bayes'Rule provides a dynamically consistent updating rule for recursive multiple-priors utility. Moreover, a rich set of learning dynamics is admitted. For example, in many environments ambiguity can plausibly persist inde…nitely.
6 In others, ambiguity may increase in response to a 'surprising' observation that leads the agent to doubt her previous view (model) of the environment.
An important outstanding question is "what are reasonable values for i ?" One possible approach is to apply Bayesian detection theory for discriminating between probability laws in order to assess how di¢ cult it would be to discriminate between measures lying in the set of priors corresponding to a speci…c value for i . This route has been developed by Anderson et al. (2000) for their model of robust decision-making; it seems likely that the approach could be adapted to our model. 1 For a related paper dealing with the characterization of e¢ cient allocations see, for example, Chateauneuf et al (2000) . The two-period model that follows di¤ers in that more concrete results are delivered as a result of strong functional form assumptions. More importantly, the model and its essential predictions may be extended to a multi-period dynamic setting as I describe below.
2 See Gur Huberman (2000) for recent market evidence of the preference to bet on the familiar.
3 These properties rely on the facts: (i) t is decreasing in W 1 t and increasing in W 2 t ; (ii) cov(f (X); X) 0 for any random variable X and increasing function f ; and (iii) various properties of that are available on request. The key property is described after the proof of the theorem.
4 The model is a special case of that described by myself and Wang (1994).
5 The noted companion paper by Hansen et al disagrees. They claim in their discussion of their 'constraint preferences'model that it satis…es a weaker form of dynamic consistency but one that still rules out the revision of ex ante optimal plans. In my view, their notion of dynamic consistency is irrelevant to the issues at hand. 6 Bewley's (1998) discussion of learning under "Knightian uncertainty" is very relevant
here.
